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Abstract. Smart contracts are the artifact of the blockchain that provide 
immutable and verifiable specifications of physical transactions. Solidity is a 
domain-specific programming language with the purpose of defining smart 
contracts. It aims at reducing the transaction costs occasioned by the execution 
of contracts on the distributed ledgers such as the Ethereum. However, Solidity 
contracts need to adhere safety and security requirements that require formal 
verification and certification. This paper proposes a method to meet such 
requirements by translating Solidity contracts to Event-B models, supporting 
certification. To that purpose, we define a restrained Solidity subset and a 
transfer function which translates Solidity contracts to Event-B models. Then 
we take advantage of Event-B method capabilities to refine models at different 
levels of abstraction to verify Solidity contracts’ properties. And we can verify 
the generated proof obligations of the Event-B model with the help of the Rodin 
platform. 
Keywords: Blockchain, Smart contract, Solidity, Event-B model, formal 
verification for security. 
1 Introduction 
The blockchain [1] is a distributed storage technology that provides safe and 
immutable storage of multi-party transactions by using fault tolerance and encryptions 
of data block chains linking the successive transactions. Once recorded in the chain, 
the data of a given block cannot be altered without altering all subsequent blocks, 
requiring consensus with the majority of parties in the network. Ethereum is a 
blockchain-based distributed computing platform which provides a decentralized 
virtual machine for executing scripts, such as Solidity contracts, using an 
internationally distributed network of public nodes [2]. 
A smart contract is the specification of contract terms using an algorithm that 
execute automatically when its pre-conditions are met (e.g. online user agreements). 
In recent modern society, smart contracts transfer manually signed contracts on 
virtual networks and store them in a secure database or distributed ledger. 
Solidity [3] is one of the popular specification languages to write smart contracts 
for the blockchain. It is a high-level object-oriented programming language for 
writing smart contracts dedicated to the Ethereum Virtual Machine. Solidity is 
statically typed, supports inheritance, libraries, and user-defined types, among other 
features. While it is usually quite easy to build a well-typed program that works as 
expected, it is much harder to verify that a smart contract cannot be used in an 
unanticipated or aggrieving manner. 
Safety and security are hence essential properties for Solidity contracts, as valuable 
assets can be transferred through the transactions they automate. The potential 
security risks a Solidity contract exposes are to exploit vulnerabilities in either of the 
blockchain infrastructure or an underspecified contract algorithm (intentionally or not) 
to bias transactions and cause losses to other parties. The theft of funds in the DAO 
project of Ethereum [4] is one of the most significant example of security issues of 
smart contracts in the blockchain, which resulted in the loss of 60 million dollars from 
the account. Moreover, in April 2018, the BEC was exposed for security 
vulnerabilities and was attacked by hackers in the ERC-20 smart contract of Ethereum, 
causing an immense price crash which, if repeated, would lead the public to 
eventually distrust the technology altogether. 
To try mitigating the reoccurrence of such events, developers have favored open-
sourcing infrastructures for the block chains and making individual smart contracts 
and their execution public, as well as strengthening the security of contract 
implementations, using formal methods for verification. Formal method is a method 
of describing and reasoning computer system by mathematical method, and using 
formal reasoning for the development and analyses of a formal model for the given 
system can increase opportunities for finding errors in the system under test. The cost 
variation of applying the different formal methods against the programming model is 
shown in Fig. 1[5]. In this paper, we use Event-B method [5] which is a theorem 
proving method with a highest cost; therefore, it is suitably applied to our situations 
where more risk of funds security involved. 
 
Fig. 1 Formal verification methods versus cost 
Event-B is a formal verification environment based on a typed set theory to specify 
and implement algorithms and systems as discrete transition systems [5]. It consists of 
two components: contexts and machines. 
⚫ A context is made of constants linked to some properties that define axioms, 
and sets that define data types.  
⚫ A machine has variables associated to invariants, and events. An event 
consists of a guard and an action. The guard denotes the enabling condition of 
the event, and the action denotes the way the event modifies the state.  
As shown in Fig. 2, the dynamics of the model is “Events”, which contains guards 
and actions. And they must satisfy the properties of constants and the invariants of 
variables, which belong to the static part.  
 
 
Fig. 2 Structure of the Event-B model 
The work presented in this paper is motivated by the need to build tools and 
techniques to improve security of smart contract by formal verification. We verify 
certain functionality and security requirements for the Solidity contract by translating 
it to the corresponding Event-B model with an appropriate transfer function, and then 
we simulate the model to validate the contracts’ correct functionality and verify 
properties related to the Solidity contract using Event-B method. For translating 
Solidity contracts to Event-B [6] first-order logic, the Solidity language semantics 
should be well defined and understood to be semantically translated to Event-B 
language [7]. Our translation allows the validation of the functionality and 
verification of the properties related to the Solidity contract while preserving the 
semantics of the Solidity contract in the Event-B model.  
Once verified, the contract can then be safely deployed on a public network. If one 
generated proof obligation cannot be verified, it will help us locate the problem which 
originates in the failure to prove the required invariants. 
2 Related work 
Solidity contracts have been widely used on the Ethereum platform for many 
companies to launch projects. Writing secure and safe smart contracts can be 
extremely difficult due to various business logics, as well as platform vulnerabilities 
and limitations. Formal methods have been advocated to mitigate these vulnerabilities. 
This paper proposes Event-B method to model and verify the Solidity contracts to 
improve their security, which complements some other articles on the same topic. In 
parallel with this work, there is some related formalization research on Solidity 
contracts and blockchain platform as follows. 
The SMT-based formal verification module within the compiler of Solidity 
contracts has been described by Leonardo Alt [11]. SMT solver is a formal 
verification tool that checks the module automatically and it has been used to prove 
that the contract code satisfies the specification given by “require/assert” statements. 
It considers “assert” statements as assumptions and tries to prove that the conditions 
inside “assert” statements are always true. If an assertion fails, the SMT solver 
generates a counterexample for the user, indicating the possible violation scenario.  
Yuepeng Wang et al. [12] described a formal verification tool VERISOL towards 
smart contracts verification and bug-finding. However, it cannot apply to a general 
smart contract but a given one which implements the underlying workflow policy 
expressed as finite state machines. What’s more, model checking method will 
confront state explosion when given system gets very complicated. Our approach to 
verifying properties of general Solidity contracts is based on first-order theorem 
proving, which is not limited to any particular specification.  
Bhargavan K [13] used early a theorem proving technique for checking correctness 
of Solidity contracts by translation to F*, which is an interesting and pioneering 
research but is very complex like monads for side effects, dependent types and 
interaction with SMT provers. Another imperative language Dafny has the similar 
mechanism of proof, which is simpler to use. We have done a similar work with the 
simpler verification method in Event-B, which also supports a refinement of the 
model to verify more precise properties. 
Grishchenko et al. formalized the EVM in F* [14] and they have run EVM tests to 
show the reliability of their model. But they haven’t proved properties of any concrete 
contracts. Instead they consider classes of bugs in smart contracts and try to define 
general properties that prevent these. We have proposed a general verification 
framework and take a concrete Solidity contract honeypot as an example at the same 
time. 
Ton Chanh Le et al. [15] determined the input conditions for which a smart 
contract terminates (or does not terminate) by proving conditional termination and 
non-termination statically. This is done by making sure that both, current state of the 
smart contract and the contract’s input satisfy the termination condition to run on a 
proof carrying blockchain before the actual execution of the contract. They focus on 
the termination of smart contracts while we propose a general verification approach to 
the functionality of smart contracts. 
Jakob Botsch Nielsen et al. [16] has formalized the execution model of blockchains 
in Coq, which is an excellent prover assistant and used their formalization to prove 
formally a smart contract. They have showed a simplified version of the DAO but the 
model was limited than the actual situation because it cannot send out more 
transactions than have been created in proposals. 
3 From Solidity contracts to Event-B models 
Based on the previous introduction of definitions, we establish a semantical map 
between Solidity contracts and Event-B language. Fig. 3 outlines the framework to 
analyze and formally verify Solidity contracts using Event-B method. Once we have 
the Solidity contact translated to Event-B model, its correctness is established by 
proof obligations for the invariants, which should be preserved by each event, 
including the initialization event. We first analyze the syntax of Solidity contracts to 
define an appropriate transfer function, which takes the solidity contract as input, and 
outputs the corresponding abstract Event-B model. The most important part of the 
smart contract is its properties and constraints. Some of them are explicit in the form 
of a statement like “require”, which we can translate directly to specific Event-B 
guards according to the translation rules. As we have mentioned before, Event-B 
guards are used to define preconditions that should hold before the event can be 
executed. Others are implicit like the requirement that the total balance of funds be 
constant during a safe remote purchase transaction, which can be concluded manually 
by refining our abstract model. In our refined model, we define similar events to 
model the updates on the abstract one. And the correctness of the gluing invariant 
over the two models can keep the correctness of the Solidity contract, which is 
modeled by the invariants with respect to the Event-B model.           
Each main component of Solidity contracts like type declaration, attributes, 
constructor and functions are modeled in Event-B. And properties related to the 
correct operation of the Solidity contract are modeled as Event-B invariants. Rodin 
platform [8] is used to check these invariants and validate the correct functionality of 
events using simulation as shown in Fig. 3. Once the result of verification is false, we 
can find the location of errors and go to the modification part to modify our smart 
contracts; if everything is ok, we can obtain a certificate for our smart contracts and 
apply them. In the following section, we define a transfer function based on Solidity 
subset and explain the translation rules with a concrete Solidity contract.  
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Fig. 3 Translation and verification of Solidity contracts in Event-B 
3.1 Solidity Subset Grammar 
Solidity is a contract-oriented, high-level language whose syntax is similar to that of 
JavaScript and it is designed to target the Ethereum Virtual Machine. Here we 
consider a restricted subset of solidity shown in Fig. 4, which contains the main 
functionality of this language. And we predefine three types of statements in solidity: 
⚫ Arithmetic expressions AExp (elements are denoted α, α0, α1…) 
⚫ Boolean expressions BExp (elements are denoted b, b0, b1…) 
⚫ Commands Com (elements are denoted c, c0, c1…) 
Let n, n0, n1…denote integers, x, x0, x1…denote a countable set of variables, t, t0, 
t1…denote a countable set of variables addr denote type ‘address’ in solidity. ‘Exp’ 
contains <AExp> and <BExp>. 
 
Fig. 4 Syntax of the Solidity subset written in BNF notation 
Notably, the subset of solidity defined here does not include loops, which needs to 
be translated to a very complex structure in Event-B model. Although it does not 
affect our case study but we try to solve it in the future. The three main types of 
declarations within a contract are type declarations, property declarations, and 
methods. Type declarations mainly consist of integers, strings, address, structs, enums 
and mappings. Property declarations are reflected in keywords like “public” and 
“payable”. Any user or contract can call or access the variables and functions 
decorated by “public”. Payable is a special method for receiving Ethereum; for 
example, when we invoke any function in Solidity contracts with “Payable”, we need 
to transfer tokens (i.e. msg.value) not lower than specified values before the body of 
the function executes. State variables (variables declared outside the function) default 
to the "storage" form and are permanently written to the blockchain; variables 
declared inside the function default to "memory" type, and they disappear after the 
function call ends. Methods are compiled in Ethereum virtual machine into a single 
function that runs when a transaction is sent to the contract’s address.  
3.2 Smart contract honeypot Example: Gift_1_eth 
As an example, we consider a concrete smart contract honeypot, whose source code 
can be found on the GitHub website [9]. Honeypot contracts are such contracts that 
hold ethers but pretend to do so in an insecure manner, fooling hackers into thinking 
that they can steal the ethers from those contracts. Its source code is available for 
everyone to analyze and modify. As a lot of variation derived from Gift_1_eth exist in 
blockchains, some have the same source code, while others make some minor 
changes. In this case study, we present one of them in Table 1 and translate it to 
Event-B model according the following rules. Then we use Event-B method to 
analyze and verify the properties related to the Solidity contract. There are three main 
functions to ensure the transaction go smoothly. 
⚫ SetPass (): When the sender’s transaction value is bigger than 1 ether and the 
variable passHasBeenSet is set to false, it can set the new password (i.e. 
hashPass). 
⚫ GetGift (): When the password entered is equal to the set value (i.e. hashPass), 
the sender can take all ethers in the contract. 
⚫ PassHasBeenSet (): if the password entered equals to the set value (i.e. 
hashPass), then the variable passHasBeenSet will be set to true. 
Table 1  Solidity contract source code 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
pragma solidity ^0.4.17; 
contract Gift_1_ETH 
{     
    bool passHasBeenSet = false;   
    function()payable{}     
    function GetHash(bytes pass) constant returns 
(bytes32) {return sha3(pass);} 
    bytes32 public hashPass;     
    function SetPass(bytes32 hash) 
    payable 
    { 
        if(!passHasBeenSet&&(msg.value >= 1 ether)) 
        { 
            hashPass = hash; 
        } 
    }     
    function GetGift(bytes pass) returns (bytes32) 
    { 
 
        if( hashPass == sha3(pass)) 
        { 
            msg.sender.transfer(this.balance); 
        } 
        return sha3(pass); 
    }     
    function PassHasBeenSet(bytes32 hash) 
    { 
        if(hash==hashPass) 
        { 
           passHasBeenSet=true; 
30 
31 
32 
33 
        } 
    } 
} 
The typical Solidity contract shown in Table 1 is made up of four components, 
such as type declaration, attributes, constructor and functions. In particular, it consists 
of a single-entry point that decides on which method code to invoke upon the 
incoming transaction (such as a received message msg). Its methods have access to 
global variables that contain information about the contract (such as the current 
balance of the contract in this.balance), the transaction used to invoke the contract’s 
method (such as the source address in msg.sender, and the amount of Ether received 
in msg.value). It supports several methods of transferring ethers between the 
contracts (like msg. sender. transfer(amount)).  
3.3 Translation from Solidity to Event-B 
As shown in in Fig. 5, we define a transfer function T who translates our solidity 
syntax to Event-B while preserving the semantics. Here the input is the syntax 
elements of Solidity subset defined in Fig. 4 like a, b, c, t and the function of the 
Solidity subset. The transfer function T outputs the corresponding syntax elements of 
Event-B. We define such a general translation mapping for the solidity contract: 
⚫ Type declaration is translated to sets and axioms in Event-B. 
⚫ Attributes are translated to variables and invariants in Event-B. 
⚫ Constructor is translated to initialization in Event-B. 
⚫ Functions are translated to events, constants and axioms in Event-B.  
 
Fig. 5 Transfer function of the Solidity subset  
Then we structurally translate Solidity to Event-B by giving translation rules for 
each construct separately and in detail. 
1) Contracts are translated to Event-B project, which contains Event-B machines 
and Event-B context. 
2) Type declaration is translated to sets and axioms in a context. For example, if 
Solidity contracts use a data type like unsigned integer which is the same in Event-B 
language, then it’s easy to translate it. If not, we construct a corresponding set to 
represent it. For example, the address type is unique in Solidity contracts, and thus we 
abstract it as a set called “ADDRESS” in Event-B. And we defined a variable 
“address_tem” as a current set recoding all the addresses who call this contract. As 
shown in Fig. 6. 
Solidity Contract Event-B Model
address payable public seller;
Machine
Variable seller address_tem
Invariants
   @inv1 address_tem ADDRESS 
   @inv2 seller address_tem
Context
sets ADDRESS  
Fig. 6 Translation of the type declaration of “seller” 
3) Attributes are replaced by variables and invariants, and the invariants here are 
used to specify the type of variables, or else we do not know which type of the 
variable is. All variables have defaulted to property “public” and they need 
initialization, as shown in Fig. 6. 
4) The constructor is replaced by initialization. The input parameters are replaced 
by constants defined in the context. What’s more, initialization in Event-B will 
contain initialization of all variables which is different with the constructor in Solidity 
contracts. Here we take the Gift_1_eth contract as example. Its constructor only 
contains a “payable” keyword which means all other address invoke this contract 
need to pay specified ethers. It doesn’t affect our Event-B model because the value of 
the balance initialized is arbitrary, and thus the translated initialization event contains 
only initialization of four variables. As shown in Fig. 7. 
Solidity Contract Event-B Model
function() payable{};
Machine
  event INITIALISATION extends INITIALISATION
    then
      @act1 passHasBeenSet:=FALSE
      @act2 hashPass:=password
      @act3 address_tem:={this}
      @act4 balanceof:={this initial_balance}
  end
 
Fig. 7 Translation of the constructor 
5) Functions are translated into events. In this part, require/assert statements are 
very important as a premise of successfully calling the function, and we translate 
them to Event-B guards in the events. If statement is translated to our specified 
function in Event-B as already shown in the transfer function T. If some functions are 
decorated with “payable”, we will create a variable called “balanceof” in Event-B 
machine, which is a map from addresses to their balances. At the same time, we 
create two necessary parameters called “msg_sender” and “msg_value”. Besides, we 
need to define a particular event called “NewAccount”, and it represents the new 
address which invokes this contract. If statement is translated to a specified function 
structure mentioned in Fig. 5. Here we take the function PassHasBeenSet as example, 
where we translate the data type byte32 to the integer in Event-B because it doesn’t 
matter the functionality and it’s simple to show. As shown in Fig. 8. 
Solidity Contract Event-B Model
function PassHasBeenSet(bytes32 hash)
    {
        if(hash==hashPass)
        {
           passHasBeenSet=true;
        }
    }
Machine
  event PassHasBeenSet
    any hash msg_sender
    where
      @grd1 hash Z
      @grd2 msg_sender address_tem\{this}
    then
      @act1 passHasBeenSet:={TRUE TRUE，
FALSE passHasBeenSet}(bool(hashPass=hash))
  end
 
Fig. 8 Translation of the function 
Based on the previous translation rules, we have finished a corresponding 
translation of the Solidity contract with an Event-B abstract machine named 
Gfit_ether_m1 and the Event-B context named Gift_ether_c. We have put the source 
code of the whole Event-B model on the GitHub website [10], where we also have put 
another verified Event-B model translated from a famous and typical Solidity contract 
named SafeRemotePurchase. Next, we present the remaining important parts of the 
Event-B abstract model expect for what we have already shown in previous 
translation rules. 
In Table 2, we have modeled a data entity, whose first part defines an abstract set 
“ADDRESS”, which we will use as the source of unique identifiers for different 
addresses. In the second part, “this” represents the address of the contract itself, which 
is necessary for every translated model. “password” is the initial value of the variable 
“hashPass” in the Event-B machine and “initial_balance” is the initial balance of the 
contract address “this”. Besides, “TRANSFER_VALUE” is the default of the 
minimum transaction value when calling a function decorated with a keyword 
“payable”. For convenience, we use the integer as the common data type for the last 
three constants. Although their data types will be more precise and a little different in 
Solidity contracts, it does not affect our modelling of the contract functionality. When 
saving an Event-B component, Rodin starts type checker to ensure that types are 
correctly used. 
Table 2 Event-B’s context model 
context Gift_ether_c 
sets ADDRESS 
constants this password initial_balance TRANSFER_VALUE  
axioms 
  @axm1 this∈ADDRESS 
  @axm2 password∈Z 
  @axm3 initial_balance∈N1 
  @axm4 TRANSFER_VALUE∈N1 
end 
In the event SetPass as shown in Table 3, we define three parameters and five 
guards, where @grd4 requires that the value transferred cannot exceed the balance 
and @grd5 requires that the value transferred should be higher than the default. These 
two guards keep the properties of the Solidity contract. Then we define two actions: 
@act1 is obtained by using the translation rules applied to the if statement, and @act2 
is obtained by using the translation rules applied to the keyword “payable”. 
Table 3 Event “SetPass” of the Event-B model 
event SetPass 
any hash msg_sender msg_value 
where 
  @grd1 hash∈Z 
  @grd2 msg_sender∈address_tem∖ {this} 
  @grd3 msg_value∈N1 
  @grd4 msg_value≤balanceof(msg_sender) 
  @grd5 msg_value≥TRANSFER_VALUE 
then 
@act1 hashPass:={TRUE↦hash,FALSE↦hashPass} 
(bool(passHasBeenSet=FALSE 
∧msg_value≥TRANSFER_VALUE)) 
   @act2 balanceof:=balanceof<+{this↦ 
balanceof(this)+msg_value 
,msg_sender ↦ balanceof(msg_sender)−msg_value} 
end 
 
4 Simulation and verification 
After finishing the translation work, we can obtain an abstract Event-B model, which 
should perform the correct behavior as the Solidity contract does. We use the 
simulation function of a Rodin’s plugin called ProB. It serves to validate that the 
model’s behaviors are consistent with the design, which can easily help us to simulate 
the Solidity contract. As shown in Fig. 9, we have simulated the abstract model in 
Rodin by assigning different values to the parameters and result shows that our model 
performs the correct behaviors as we expected, it’s a process of interacting with the 
tool. 
 Fig. 9 Simulation of the Event-B model 
Besides, each property generates a number of proofs obligations. These proof 
obligations are proven one by one, some are automatically discharged using the proof 
tools like SMT provers, and some need to be proven interactively by providing certain 
rewrite rules to simplify the obligation. In the following, we state two important 
properties for guaranteeing the security of the Solidity contract. The first one is 
defined for the abstract machine Gift_ether_m1, and it states that the balance of each 
account should be strictly positive or zero. 
Prop. 1 balanceof∈address_tem→ℕ 
As shown in Fig. 10, it is defined as invariants in Event-B model, the tool 
generates proof obligations which are successfully discharged using Event-B proof 
control. (a completed proof is indicated by a green mark). 
 
Fig. 10 Verified proofs obligations of the Event-B model 
The second one is that the balance of the sender should not be changed while the 
variable passHasBeenSet is true (we don’t consider the cost of the mining), which 
means that we shouldn’t pay for the function if it can’t be used by us.  
Prop. 2 ∀i·i∈address_tem, passHasBeenSet=FALSE ⇒  
Balanceof (i) [Before SetPass] =balaceof (i) [After SetPass] 
This property prevents the function from stealing funds from our account, and we 
need to construct a refined model Gift_ether_m2 to make the event SetPass precise 
and verify this property. As shown in Table 4, we emphasize the condition that 
passHasBeenSet equals to true in @grd6, and the @act2 states that the balance should 
not be changed.  
Table 4 Refined event “SetPass” of the Event-B model 
event SetPass refines SetPass 
any hash msg_sender msg_value 
where 
   @grd1 hash∈Z 
   @grd2 msg_sender∈address_tem\{this} 
   @grd3 msg_value∈N1 
   @grd4 msg_value≤balanceof(msg_sender) 
   @grd5 msg_value≥TRANSFER_VALUE 
   @grd6 passHasBeenSet=TRUE 
then 
   @act1 hashPass≔ hashPass 
   @act2 balanceof≔ balanceof 
end 
The result shows that there is one proof cannot be completed, it points out that our 
Solidity contract has a logical vulnerability in SetPass function as shown in Fig. 11. In 
fact, before the contract is attacked, the contract creator sets a password that only he 
knows and set the variable passHasBeenSet to true, so that only the contract creator 
can take out the ether in the contract. Others who try to call the SetPass function will 
loss at least one ether! And that’s the point of this contract honeypot. Our Event-B 
model can be further refined in order to include more properties about the Solidity 
contract, while preserving the correctness of the invariants. 
 
Fig. 11 Uncompleted proof obligation 
5 Conclusion 
In this paper, we propose an approach for translating Solidity contracts to Event-B, 
making a contribution to enhance security of Solidity contracts by verifying its 
properties via formal verification. For this purpose, we have defined the transfer 
function from Solidity subset languages to the Event-B model while preserving the 
semantics. To better demonstrate the practicability of our approach, we have 
translated a Solidity contract honeypot to the Event-B model according to the 
translation rules. We use the ProB tool to simulate our abstract model to validate that 
it performs the expected behaviors, and some basic properties verification and type 
checking are automatically done by Rodin. Finally, we successfully found the logical 
vulnerability by formally refinement in Event-B. We found it is of great importance to 
apply this approach to other Solidity contracts involved huge funds transactions. 
The approach we present here is based on first-order theorem proving, it provides 
functional verification of the Solidity contract at different levels of abstraction. The 
rich expressive language of the first-order logic allows us to verify complex 
properties of Solidity contracts. As future work, we will extend current Solidity 
contracts subset to more types and features, and establish a more refined description 
of Solidity contracts which will allow the verification of more detailed properties. 
We also plan to realize a translator tool for more efficient and more practical 
translation from Solidity contracts to Event-B models. The algorithm should follow 
the translation rules defined in our approach. It can help smart contracts developers 
who are not familiar with formal methods to improve the security of smart contracts. 
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